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ABSTRACT
Dynamic epistemic logics provide an account of the evolution of 
agents’ belief and knowledge when they learn the occurrence of 
an event. These logics started to become popular about 20 years
ago and by now there exists a huge number of publications about 
them. The present paper briefly summarises the existing body of 
literature, discusses some problems and shortcomings, and proposes 
some avenues for future research.
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1. Introduction
Dynamic epistemic logics (DELs) are an important recent development in the field of non-
classical logics. Research on this family of logics blossomed during the last 15 years.
The success story began with an early paper by Plaza (1989) that remained basically
unnoticed for the next 10 years. It was by the end of the 1990s that it was taken up.
Early foundational papers are due to Baltag, Moss, and Solecki (1998), Baltag and Moss
(2004) and Gerbrandy and Groeneveld (1997), Gerbrandy (1999), that were followed by
many others. This notably led to the republication of Plaza’s original paper almost twenty
years after the first publication (Plaza, 2007). A rather early textbook was published in 2007
(van Ditmarsch, van Der Hoek, & Kooi, 2007).
The present contribution is an attempt to briefly sum up the state of the art and to
provide a critical analysis of the roads the field took in the last years. My main message
is that progress was perhaps not as overwhelming as one might think when one sees
the impressive number of papers that were published under the DEL label. I will argue
that several difficult and involved problems were overlooked or just left aside, including
foundational issues such as the integration of belief revision operations and the suitability
of DELs as logics of communication, as well as more technical issues such as the closure of
a class of epistemic models under updates.
In the next sections, I will start by recallingwhatDELs are (Section 2). The rest of the paper
provides a critical examination of the received views about DELs. It is organised according
to the three keywords making up the acronym, in reverse order: I will question the status of
DELs as logics (Section 3, point out some weaknesses of the commonly assumed epistemic
component (Section 4), and finally discuss some issues with the dynamic component
(Section 5). Each time I will point out several mismatches between the discourse about
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DELs and the state of the art; as I will emphasise, several important issues that are difficult
to settle received too little attention up to now. I will conclude by pointing out some
perspectives and research avenues for future work (Section 6).
2. DELs in a nutshell
I start by a brief overview of DELs. The presentation is standard: language, semantics and
axiomatics.
2.1. Language
The DEL language is an interesting and powerful combinations of two kinds of modal
operators: epistemic operators of the form Ki where i is an agent and dynamic operators[
E
]
where E is an event. The formula Kiϕ reads ‘i knows that ϕ’ and the formula
〈
E
〉
ϕ reads
‘E may occur and ϕ is true afterwards’. (Many papers also consider the common knowledge
operator, which however will play no role in the present exposition.) Such combinations
were first considered in AI more than 30 years ago (Moore, 1985). In its simplest form, the
event E is the public announcement of (the truth of) a formula χ , written χ !. In its most
general form, E is made up of a set of possible events having pre- and postconditions, an
accessibility relation on that set, and an actual event. When 〈e, e′〉 ∈ Si then agent i cannot
distinguish the occurrence of e from that of e′. The precondition of an event describes the
conditions under which the event may occur; the postcondition describes its effects on the
world in terms of assignments of formulas to propositional variables: when p gets assigned
ϕ then after the event the truth value of p equals the truth value of ϕ before the event (van
Ditmarsch, van der Hoek, & Kooi, 2005). For instance, when¬p is assigned to p then p’s truth
value gets flipped.
Formally, an event model is a tuple 〈E, {Si}i∈I, pre, post, e0〉where
• E is a non-empty set of possible events;
• Si ⊆ E × E is a binary relation on E, for every element i of the set of agents I;
• pre : E −→ L is a total function;
• post : E −→ (P −→ L) is a partial function with finite domain;
• e0 ∈ E.
The set P is the set of propositional variables; the set L is either the set of formulas of
epistemic logic or the set of formulas of DEL.1
Most of the approaches consider events without postconditions, or rather, with the
identity postcondition function postid such that postid(e)(p) = p: all variables keep their
truth value. Such events have no effect on the world: they are purely epistemic and only
change the agents’ epistemic state. Figure 1 is a typical example of a purely epistemic
event model where p is privately announced to agent 1: there are two possible events
e = 〈p!, postid〉 and f = 〈⊤!, postid〉; agent 2 believes that ⊤! happens, i.e. that nothing is
learned, and that this is moreover common knowledge; agent 1 believes that p! happens
while 2 does not know this. The actual event is e; the underlining in Figure 1 signals this.
As usual in modal logic,
[
E !
]
ϕ abbreviates¬
〈
E !
〉
¬ϕ.
Figure 1. Event model E1:p! of the private announcement of p to agent 1, where e = 〈p!,postid〉 and
f = 〈⊤!,postid〉.
Figure 2. Static epistemic modelMign where both agent 1 and agent 2 do not know whether p (and this
is common knowledge).
2.2. Semantics
DEL models have accessibility relations for the epistemic operators, one per agent i. Each
relation Ri relates worlds that i cannot distinguish based on her knowledge, and Kiϕ is true
at a possible worldw in amodelM if ϕ is true at everyworld that i cannot distinguish fromw
inM. While the interpretation of the epistemic operators is thus standard, the interpretation
of the dynamic operators deviates from the traditional modal logic setting: there is no
accessibility relation for them. So DEL models are nothing but models of the underlying
‘static’ epistemic logic. Formally they are tuples of the formM = 〈W , {R}i∈I, V ,w0〉whereW
is a non-empty set of possible worlds, Ri ⊆ W ×W is a binary relation onW for every agent
i ∈ I, V : P −→ 2W is a valuation function associating to every p ∈ P the set of worlds
where p is true, and w0 ∈ W is the actual world. Figure 2 contains an example of a DEL
model where both agent 1 and agent 2 do not know whether p is true or not, and where
this is common knowledge. The actual world is the lower world {p} (underlined in Figure 2).
The interpretation of the epistemic operators is standard: forM = 〈W , {R}i∈I, V ,w0〉, the
truth condition is
M  Kiϕ if 〈W , {R}i∈I, V ,w〉  ϕ for everyw such that 〈w0,w〉 ∈ Ri .
Dynamic operators are interpreted by means of so-called model updates. The simplest
case is themodel update that is associated to the public announcement χ !. It is interpreted
by a partial function on the set of pointed Kripke models which restricts the set of possible
worldsW of a modelM to ||χ ||M.
2 The accessibility relation and the valuation are restricted
in consequence. So when M  pre(e) then3 the update of the epistemic model M =
〈W , {R}i∈I, V ,w0〉 by χ is the epistemic model
Mχ = 〈||χ ||M, {R
χ
i }i∈I, V
χ ,w0〉
where R
χ
i = Ri ∩ (||χ ||M × ||χ ||M) and V
χ (p) = V(p) ∩ ||χ ||M.
4 The truth condition for the
public announcement operator is:
M 
〈
χ !
〉
ϕ if M  χ andMχ  ϕ.
In its most general form, an update is a restricted product between an epistemic model
and an event model: the formula
〈
E
〉
ϕ is true at possible world w in M if the actual event
of E may occur at w in M and ϕ is true at w in the update ME of M by E . Formally, for
E = 〈E, {Si}i∈I, pre, post, e0〉 andM = 〈W , {R}i∈I, V ,w0〉:
M 
〈
E
〉
ϕ if M  pre(e0) andM
E
 ϕ
whereME = 〈WE , {RE }i∈I, V
E , (w0, e0)〉with
WE =
{
(w, e) : w ∈ W , e ∈ E, and 〈W , {R}i∈I, V ,w〉  pre(e)
}
,
REi =
{
〈(w, e), (w′, e′)〉 : 〈w,w′〉 ∈ Ri and 〈e, e
′〉 ∈ Si
}
,
VE (p) =
{
(w, e) ∈ WE : 〈W , {R}i∈I, V ,w〉  post(e)(p)
}
.
For example, the update of the static epistemic modelMign of Figure 2 by the event model
E1:p! of Figure 1 is the static epistemic model (Mign)
E1:p! depicted in Figure 3. The actual
world is
(
{p}, e
)
, underlined in the figure. Observe that the updatedmodel does not contain
the world
(
∅, e
)
becauseMign 6 pre(e). We have (Mign)
E1:p!  K1p ∧ ¬K2p ∧ ¬K2K1p, from
which it follows thatMign 
〈
E1:p!
〉(
K1p ∧ ¬K2p ∧ ¬K2K1p
)
.
2.3. Axiomatics
An axiomatisation of DELs that is parametrised by the axiomatisation of the underlying
epistemic logic is contained in Table 1.5 It consists in a complete collection of reduction ax-
ioms: equivalences whose successive application allows to eliminate all dynamic operators.
We therefore end up with a ‘static’ epistemic formula.6
3. Logic?
According to the classical definition, a modal logic is a set of modal formulas that contains
all classical propositional theorems and that is closed under uniform substitution, modus
ponens, and necessitation (Gabbay, Kurucz, Wolter, & Zakharyaschev, 2003). This is a rather
restrictive definition which excludes DELs: indeed, they fail to be closed under uniform
substitution.7
Figure 3. The static epistemic model (Mign)
E1:p! after agent 1 has privately learned that p (resulting from
the update of the static epistemic modelMign of Figure 2 by the event model E1:p! of Figure 1).
Table 1. Axiomatisation of DELs, where we suppose that E = 〈E, {Si}i∈I,pre,post, e〉 and E
′ =
〈E, {Si}i∈I,pre,post, e
′〉.
EL Some axiomatics of epistemic logic (e.g. that of S5)
RE (
[
E
]
)
ψ ↔ ψ ′[
E
]
ψ ↔
[
E
]
ψ ′
Red (p)
[
E
]
p ↔
(
pre(e)→ post(e)(p)
)
, for p atomic
Red (¬)
[
E
]
¬ψ ↔
(
pre(e)→ ¬
[
E
]
ψ
)
Red (∧)
[
E
](
ψ1∧ψ2
)
↔
([
E
]
ψ1∧
[
E
]
ψ2
)
Red (Ki)
[
E
]
Kiψ ↔
(
pre(e)→
∧
〈e,e′〉∈Si
Ki
[
E ′
]
ψ
)
Let us adopt a more liberal position and accept as logics sets of formulas that are not
closed under uniform substitution. DELs fail to satisfy a further, fundamental requirement
for logics, viz. that language and semantics should be distinct that are only linked via the
interpretation function. DELs with event models violate this principle: the event model
E in the formula
[
E
]
ϕ is a semantical object. This was felt to be a problem right from
the start, and several proposals for a language allowing to talk about event models were
put forward (Aucher, 2008b, 2009’; Kooi, 2003; van Eijck, Sietsma, & Wang, 2011). Several
other approaches allow to at least partly capture event models (Bolander et al., 2016;
Gerbrandy, 1999; Gerbrandy & Groeneveld, 1997; van Ditmarsch, 2000, 2002). However, it is
only recently that a solutionwasproposed that I find satisfactory (Hales, Tay, & French, 2014).
It combines Gerbrandy’s private announcements to groups (Gerbrandy, 1999; Gerbrandy &
Groeneveld, 1997) with the PDL program operators.
The perspective of DEL research was mainly aimed at modelling phenomena involving
knowledge and action, and only few papers went beyond axiomatisations and investigated
mathematical properties. Public Announcement Logic PAL is best studied: it has the same
expressivity as epistemic logic due to the reduction axioms; somewhat surprisingly, the
complexity of the satisfiability problem is also the same as that of the underlying epistemic
logic (Lutz, 2006); however, it is more succinct (French, van der Hoek, Iliev, & Kooi, 2011;
Lutz, 2006). For DELs with event models it was proven that the satisfiability problem is
NEXPTIME complete when the underlying epistemic logic is K, contrasting with the PSPACE
complexity of the underlying epistemic logic (Aucher & Schwarzentruber, 2013).
Finally, there is a further requirement that is natural for logics extending epistemic logic
by dynamic operators: the dynamic extension should be a conservative extension of the
underlying epistemic logic. We will see in Section 4 that this unfortunately fails to hold for
the most relevant underlying epistemic logics.
4. Epistemic?
In the literature it is – sometimes explicitly and sometimes tacitly – supposed that DELs
provide a satisfactory formalisation of an agent’s representation of the world and its
evolution. In this section, I undertake a critical examination of this claim.
In DELs, the term ‘epistemic’ refers to an agent’s representation of the world. It is
understood in a broad sense, not only covering knowledge, but also belief. Let us have
a closer look at the various logics of knowledge and logics of belief underlying the DELs
that one can find in the literature. I first discuss logics of knowledge and then logics of belief.
4.1. Knowledge
Following Halpern et al., many authors chose S5 as their ‘official’ logic of knowledge. This is
however at odds with the philosophical logic literature, where Lenzen and Voorbraak put
forward strong arguments against the negative introspection principle of S5 and argued
for the weaker modal logic S4.2 (Lenzen, 1978; Voorbraak, 1993). It was shown in Balbiani,
van Ditmarsch, Herzig, and de Lima (2012) that this leads to serious technical difficulties: if
we chooseS4.2 instead ofS5 as the logic of knowledge underlyingDELs then the restricted
product operation of Section 2.2 fails to preserve the class of models. This is due to the fact
that the semantical condition that S4.2models have to satisfy is confluence:8 suppose the
confluence point u is the only world where the precondition of the public announcement
of ϕ is false; then u is the only world that is eliminated when the restricted product is
constructed; therefore the latter lacks the confluence property.
Beyond S4.2, this problem basically plagues every modal logic whose accessibility
relation constraints involve an existential formula: the elimination of that point may result
in a model violating that constraint.
The situation gets worse in an alternative semantic definition of DELs where the product
operation does not restrict the set of possible worlds but only the accessibility relation, as
studied e.g. by (Gerbrandy and Groeneveld 1997), (Gerbrandy 1999), Kooi (2007): beyond
existential constraints, such a recipe also makes us lose constraints such as reflexivity.
There currently is no satisfactory solution to this issue. Our proposal in (Balbiani et al.,
2012) solves the problem from a technical point of view, by means of a truth condition
that makes all those updates violating constraints inexecutable. This requires a master
modality: we have to be able to express that a constraint is true in every possible world of a
model. Moreover, even when the language has such a modality, the solution is somewhat
unsatisfactory from the point of view of intuitions.
4.2. Belief
Let us turn to logics of belief. Here, the ‘static’ logic KD45 is seen by many authors as the
logic of belief. However, dynamic extensions of KD45 face the same technical problems as
dynamic extensions of S4.2: the class of models is not preserved under restricted products.
This time it is the seriality constraint9 that may get violated by the update.
The problem is avoided if one opts for the basic modal logic K as the underlying
epistemic logic: K models do not have any constraint to satisfy, and every relativisation
of a K model is trivially a K model. However, K is a very weak logic of belief, allowing an
agent to simultaneously hold contradictory beliefs.10 As already highlighted by Hintikka
(1962), beyond closure under logical truth and modus ponens, a fundamental property of
rational belief is consistency. Consistency of agent i’s beliefs is expressed by the formula
schema¬(Biϕ∧Bi¬ϕ), which corresponds to seriality of the accessibility relation Ri . I would
like to add that even if the beliefs of a human or other ‘real’ agent can sometimes become
inconsistent, such an agent nevertheless strives to maintain consistency by revising her
beliefs. This aspect is neglected if one chooses themodal logic K. The same criticism applies
to all basic modal logics where beliefs can be inconsistent.
My last observation also leads us to the next problem that DEL extensions of logics
of belief face. It originates from the observation that while knowledge is always true,
beliefs may be false. For example, in PAL an agent may wrongly believe that some
announcement ψ cannot be made because he wrongly believes ψ to be false; formally,
Bi¬ψ is the case, which implies Bi
[
ψ !
]
⊥.11 In such a situation, the right-to-left direction
(ψ → Bi
[
ψ !
]
ϕ) →
[
ψ !
]
Biϕ of the belief version of the reduction axiom Red (Ki) of
Table 1 should intuitively be invalid. Semantically, a satisfactory doxastic version of PAL
should integrate some notion of belief revision. It however is basically still an open problem
how to do this: I believe that there are currently no suitable accounts of multiagent belief
revision that could be integrated into DELs. Indeed, while there is an abundant literature
on belief revision since the seminal 1985 paper by the ‘AGM trio’ (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors,
and Makinson, 1985), – see (Fermé & Hansson 2011) for an overview– it is fair to say that
all of the existing formalisms are complex and that they cannot be easily adapted to modal
logics. In DELs the situation is worse than in propositional logic because DEL belief revision
operations have to be designed in a modal logic setting.12 This explains that most of the
DEL extensions of logics of belief fail to account for multiagent belief revision. There exist
a few proposals for an integration (Aucher, 2004, 2008a, 2008b; Baltag & Smets, 2009;
van Benthem, 2007; van Ditmarsch, 2005). However, I would like to argue that this is not
the final word, for foundational and for implementability reasons. As far as foundations
are concerned, I disagree with many in the field who seem to consider that Baltag and
Smets’s proposal (Baltag & Smets, 2009) is currently the best solution. Their account is
grounded on the notion of safe belief, which is ‘almost knowledge’: belief that will never be
revised. It is not clear how to use such a logic to design an autonomous agent: how could
such she ever distinguish safe beliefs from other, non-safe beliefs? Furthermore, successive
application of their belief revision operation result in an ever more complex model, which
is a problem plaguing almost all iterated belief revision operations, as pointed out by
Konieczny and Pérez (2008). As far as implementability is concerned, I believe that what has
notbeenaddressedup tonow ina satisfactorymanner is thatAGMbelief revisionoperations
presuppose some kind of preference information, be it in terms of epistemic entrenchment
relations between formulas or in terms of comparative possibility relations betweenworlds.
However, in many situations to be modelled it is not so clear where this information comes
from. In my opinion, the challenge is to find simple, less demanding theories of revision
that can be easily and smoothly integrated into logics of belief and action. A good starting
point could be approaches based on language splitting and interpolation (Kourousias and
Makinson, 2007; Parikh, 1999). This can be related to uniform interpolation as recently
studied in the description logics field in order to account for modularity of ontologies (Lutz,
Seylan, & Wolter, 2012; Lutz & Wolter, 2011).
5. Dynamic?
The evolution of an agent’s epistemic state may have two different causes: first, the agent
may get a new piece of information about a static world; second, the world may evolve and
our agent observes this event, possibly only in an imperfect way.
5.1. Evolution of the world
The simplest form of the second kind of change, evolution of the world, is when it is
the truth value of some propositional variable that changes. This is captured in DELs by
event postconditions, alias the assignment of propositional variables. Previous accounts
of such kinds of change include STRIPS (Fikes & Nilsson, 1971) and Reiter’s basic action
theories (Reiter, 2001). Somewhat surprisingly and as also pointed out by van Benthem
(2011), the DEL literature largely ignores the existing literature on reasoning about what is
sometimes called ontic actions. In particular, it is well-known in that field that formalisms
are plaguedby three tenacious problems: the frameproblem, the qualification problemand
the ramification problem. The frame problem is how to specify the non-effects of an event.
The qualification problem is how to specify the preconditions of an event. The ramification
problem is to take into account domain constraints (alias integrity constraints).
As to the frame problem, I will just say here that DEL assignments elegantly solve it, as
was shown by van Ditmarsch, Herzig, and de Lima (2011), van Benthem (2011).
As to the qualification problem and the ramification problem, it seems that noDEL paper
has tried to address them.While some of the approaches could probably be imported (such
as (Thielscher 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b)), one should nevertheless note that – contrarily to
the frame problem, where Reiter’s solution was largely adopted due to its simplicity – no
consensual solution to these two problems exists in the reasoning about actions field.
5.2. Evolution of the agents’ epistemic state
The first kind of change is that of a a private announcement to a group of agents J: some
formula ϕ is announced to J in a way that is public for J. In DELs such an announcement is
identified with the precondition of an event that takes place; more precisely, for which it is
possible for the agent that it takes place. This is captured in DEL event models by an event
with precondition ϕ and an empty postcondition.
This is related to a claim that is often made, viz. that DELs are logics of communication.
The claim occurs most prominently and explicitly in the title of Plaza’s foundational paper
and in those by van Benthem (2006), van Benthem, van Eijck, and Kooi (2006). However, it
is clear that DELs lack several key ingredients of speech act theory. To start with, it is not
easy to come up with a meaningful notion of a speaker: the agent who makes a public
announcement is not part of the situation that is modelled. Furthermore, DELs currently
do not provide a good account of communicative intention. Unless such concepts can be
integrated into DELs, the field will have to wait for a good logic of communication, and
DELs have to be thought of as logics of observation and not of communication or agency.
6. Perspectives
Despite the various criticisms that I have put forward in the preceding sections, I believe
that DELs are one of the most fruitful recent developments in the domain of nonclassical
logics.
One of its most striking assets is that their models are very compact. This contrasts with
standard temporal and dynamic models whose Kripke models typically contain a huge
number of possible worlds even for rather simple applications. This makes that model
checking procedures working with Kripke models as they stand are not practically feasible.
It, however, remains that DEL model checking has to deal with Kripke models for
epistemic logics. Such Kripke models can become pretty big, too, in particular when there
are multiple agents. In the literature on model checking for multiagent systems one can
find more compact representations where the epistemic accessibility relation is built from
information about observability of propositional variables by agents (Lomuscio, van der
Meyden, & Ryan, 2000; Su, Sattar, & Luo, 2007). This perspective was recently imported into
the DEL setting in a series of papers (Balbiani, Gasquet, & Schwarzentruber, 2013; Herzig &
Lorini, 2014; vanBenthem, van Eijck, Gattinger, & Su, 2015; vanderHoek, Iliev, &Wooldridge,
2012). All these approaches however suffered from the restriction that the agents’ obser-
vational abilities are common knowledge. This was overcome by Herzig, Lorini, and Maffre
(2015), Herzig and Maffre (2016), Herzig, Lorini, Maffre, and Schwarzentruber (2016), Maffre
(2016). Furthermore, an extension with public announcements was introduced by Charrier
and Schwarzentruber (2015), Charrier, Herzig, Lorini, Maffre, and Schwarzentruber (2016). I
believe these approaches to be promising because they make model checking techniques
applicable to non-trivial scenarios.
As to the belief revision problem plaguing DELs, it is not clear to me whether and how
it will be addressed in the future. A solution that might be achievable without too much
effort is to combine the embedding of Dalal’s revision operation of Herzig (2014) with the
embedding of the above observation-based DELs.
Notes
1. Precisely, the postcondition is either restricted to epistemic formulas or defined by mutual
recursion with the truth conditions.
2. As usual, for a given M = 〈W , {R}i∈I, V ,w0〉, the notation ||χ ||M stands for the set of possible
worldsw ∈ W such that 〈W , {R}i∈I, V ,w〉  ϕ.
3. Otherwise the operation (.)E is undefined.
4. Precisely, updates are defined by mutual recursion with the truth conditions.
5. It is easy to see that it is equivalent to the axiomatisations one usually finds in papers about
DELs, such as in Wang and Cao (2013), Wang and Aucher (2013).
6. Observe that there is no reduction axiom for the case of two successive dynamic operators.
While it part of the standard axiomatisations of the literature, it is actually not necessary in the
presence of the rule of equivalence RE (
[
E
]
).
7. To see this consider the formula [p!]p: it is a theorem of PAL because its rewriting with Axiom
Red (p) results in the classical logic theoremp → p. However, the result of substitutingpby the
Moore sentence q∧¬K1q fails to be a theorem. Indeed, the formula [q ∧ ¬K1q!](q∧¬K1q) can
be rewritten by means of the reduction axioms first to [q ∧ ¬K1q!]q ∧ [q ∧ ¬K1q!]¬K1q; then
to ((q ∧ ¬K1q)→ q) ∧ ((q ∧ ¬K1q)→ ¬[q ∧ ¬K1q!]K1q, which simplifies to ((q ∧ ¬K1q)→
¬[q ∧ ¬K1q!]K1q; then to ((q∧¬K1q)→ ¬((q∧¬K1q)→ K1[q ∧ ¬K1q!]q), which simplifies
to ((q ∧ ¬K1q) → ¬K1[q ∧ ¬K1q!]q; and finally to ((q ∧ ¬K1q) → ¬K1((q ∧ ¬K1q) → q),
which simplifies to¬q ∨ K1q.
8. For every w, if 〈w, u1〉 ∈ Ri and 〈w, u2〉 ∈ Ri then there is a u such that 〈u1, u〉 ∈ Ri and
〈u2, u〉 ∈ Ri .
9. For everyw there is a u such that 〈w, u〉 ∈ Ri .
10. Some may still object that this is too strong a logic of belief because in K, an agent’s beliefs
are closed under logical truth and modus ponens. This is the so-called omniscience problem.
We leave it aside here and suppose that omniscience can be assumedwhen we are interested
in rational agents or in artificial agents.
11. The equivalence
[
ψ !
]
⊥ → ¬ψ is valid in any DEL where the truth condition for
[
ψ !
]
and the
update are defined as in Section 2.2.
12. I note in passing that if we disregard the epistemic operators then DEL public announcements
can be identified with AGM expansions, which are considered in the AGM literature to be a
very simple case of belief change.
13. The problem however kept on hauntingme and I finally succeeded some years later in solving
it (Herzig, 1996, 1998).
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a generalisation in terms of world- and arrow-updating operations that was taken upby Barteld Kooi 
and Brian Renne in two papers. Some of the unsolved issues that I have discussed in the present 
paper were among those Luis and me were struggling with during the first year of my PhD. This is 
also the place to thank my colleagues of the LILaC group from IRIT with whom I had many discussions 
on the criticisms of DELs that I put forward here and with many of whom I wrote on the subject, first 
and foremost Philippe Balbiani and Emiliano Lorini. Thanks are also due to my former or present PhD 
students with whom I worked and published on the subject, in particular Guillaume Aucher, Tiago de 
Lima, Faustine Maffre, François Schwarzentruber, Nicolas Troquard, and Zhanhao Xiao. My criticisms 
have benefitted from several discussions with other colleagues and coauthors, in particular Hans van 
Ditmarsch. Thanks are also due to Jan van Eijck for provided positive feedback on a previous draft 
during his stay in Toulouse in June 2016.
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